Iraqis head to the polls Nov. 11 to elect 329 parliament members for a four-year term, marking the seventh free election since Saddam Hussein’s 2003 fall. Candidates are treading carefully, pledging neutrality in the geopolitical tug-of-war between the United States and Iran while using accusations of “normalization with Israel” as a weapon to discredit rivals.
The specter of Israel looms large in Iraq’s electoral rhetoric, despite the country’s lack of formal ties with the state.
“There are Shiite and Sunni leaders who have given assurances for free normalization with Israel,” said lawmaker Ibrahim al-Sumaidaie, a member of Prime Minister Mohammed al-Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development bloc. “There are political figures who have started to flirt and provide assurances to Washington under the table.”
Al-Sumaidaie, who’s running for another term, predicted “the next cabinet will face pressure to join the Abraham Accords” to normalize relations with Israel but bragged only Sudani can stop the advent of Iraqi peace with Israel. His comments reflect the issue’s sensitivity, as any perceived openness to the Jewish state risks political suicide in a country where anti-Israel sentiment runs deep.
The “assurances” accusation is particularly damaging due to a 2022 law criminalizing any form of backing for Israel. This law, which led to a man’s life sentence for a pro-Israel Facebook post, has made “normalization” a radioactive term in Iraqi politics.
Former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, a Sudani-allied secular Shia with ties to Saudi Arabia, has faced such accusations but firmly rejected them. “Allawi has not and will not call for normalization with the Zionist entity,” his office stated.
Yet Israel is not the only regional player tainting Iraq’s electoral discourse.
Iran, long a dominant force in Iraqi politics, has become equally toxic for candidates. It was once a given pro-Iran factions would hold sway, particularly among Shia politicians. No more. Candidates, even those historically aligned with Tehran, are advocating for neutrality to shield Iraq from regional conflicts, including potential wars involving Iran, the United States or Israel.
MP Diaa al-Nasseri, a member of former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s State of Law bloc, praised his leader for “sparing Iraq from strikes and the regional war.” Maliki’s coalition, once a staunch Iran ally, is publicly distancing itself from the Islamic Republic. “The Iranian influence is less prominent in Iraq’s new reality,” Nasseri, also seeking reelection, argued.
It’s a departure from the past five elections, in which pro-Iran Shia factions typically united under Tehran’s orchestration. Iran’s weakened regional clout — particularly since Hamas’ Oct. 7, 2023, attack on Israel and Israel’s subsequent campaigns against Hamas and other Iranian proxies like Hezbollah — has fragmented these alliances. Shia factions, once tightly knit, are scattered across rival electoral slates, competing against one another in a sign of growing pragmatism over ideological loyalty to Iran. It reflects a broader trend toward interest-driven politics, where local concerns and power dynamics take precedence over foreign allegiances.
Iran’s declining influence is also evident in Iraq’s pro-Iran Hashd Shaabi militias’ troubles. These groups previously sought to emulate Lebanon’s Hezbollah, amassing significant power and resources while dominating state institutions. But weakened by losses and lacking strong leadership, the militias struggle to maintain their grip on state concessions, including an estimated $3 billion annually for 238,000 claimed fighters. Reports indicate only 48,000 fighters exist. The rest are imaginary fighters Iraqis call “space cadets.” Militia leaders cash ghost fighters’ salaries and redirect them to fund Iran’s operations in Lebanon and Yemen.
A proposed law to formalize the militias as government forces, securing their funding, was blocked under US pressure, forcing militia leaders to compete electorally to preserve their access to state resources.
Prominent militia figures are navigating this new reality through electoral politics. Faleh Fayyad and Ahmad al-Assadi, senior Hashd Shaabi members, are running on Sudani’s ticket, while Hadi Ameri campaigns independently under the Fatah banner. Two other militia heavyweights, Qais Khazali and Ammar Hakim, are leading their own tickets, further illustrating the splintering of once-unified pro-Iran factions.
The US-engineered ethnosectarian power-sharing model, which divided influence among Shia, Sunni and Kurds, is eroding. Each community has fractured into rival factions, forming cross-sectarian alliances based on political expediency rather than ethnic or religious identity.
The 2021 election highlighted this shift when Shia cleric Muqtada Sadr’s bloc secured 71 seats but failed to form a majority. When Sadr allied with Sunni and Kurdish factions to cross the 165-seat threshold, Iran-allied Sunni judge Faeq Zaidan controversially redefined “majority” as two-thirds, blocking Sadr’s coalition and revealing Tehran’s lingering influence. But with Tehran’s grip loosening, non-Shia figures like Sunni former speaker Mohamed al-Halbousi, previously banned, are poised to reassert their influence through next month’s election.
Iraq’s stability, underpinned by $120 billion in annual oil revenue, comes at a cost. Corruption and a bloated public sector drain resources, with politicians using patronage to secure loyalty rather than investing in infrastructure or economic diversification.
While Iraq is no longer the regional menace it was under Saddam Hussein — who invaded Kuwait in 1990, attacked Israel and sponsored terrorism — it remains far from a liberal democracy. Yet no dictatorship or civil war and the emergence of peaceful power transitions signal progress.
The 2025 election underscores Iraq’s evolving political landscape. Candidates’ focus on neutrality reflects a desire to prioritize national interests over foreign entanglements. Normalizing ties with Israel could yield economic benefits, as demonstrated by the Abraham Accords’ trade and technology gains, but public opinion, shaped by decades of anti-Israel sentiment, remains a barrier. And while Iran’s meddling in Iraqi affairs has receded, Tehran is certainly planning a comeback in Iraq and the rest of the region.
Economic diversification, critical to moving beyond oil dependency, demands pragmatic policies that normal relations with Israel and Iran could facilitate. But emotional rhetoric often overshadows these practical considerations.
Iraq’s democracy, though nascent, is taking root. The election highlights a shift toward pragmatic alliances and declining foreign influence, offering hope for a more stable and independent future. If this trajectory continues, the 2003 US-led invasion, often viewed as a catastrophe, may eventually be seen as a turning point for the better.
Hussain Abdul-Hussain is a Foundation for Defense of Democracies research fellow.